courts," whose judgments are appealable to the United States courts of appeals ' Title VII actions fall into two principal categories: those premised on the "disparate treatment" of an individual or class and those based on the "disparate impact" of a challenged employment practice. 10 This comment confines itself to consideration of disparate-treatment actions. In a series of cases, commencing with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" and culminating in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,' 2 the Supreme Court developed a procedure frequently used to prove discrimination in disparate-treatment actions.' 3 Under this procedure, a series of intermediate showings by the parties may create and rebut a presumption of discriminatory intent;1 4 this comment will consider the standard of review appropriate to a trial court's determination that such showings have or have not been made.
Although there exists a substantial literature on the conduct See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 n.15 (1977) ("Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate impact.' "). In a disparate-treatment action, the plaintiff claims that the defendant "4simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. In order to establish a defendant's liability under a theory of disparate treatment, " [p] roof of [the defendant's] discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id.
In a disparate-impact action, the defendant's lack of discriminatory motive is irrelevant. Id. The plaintiff usually establishes the defendant's liability by proving that an employment practice not compelled by the exigencies of the employer's business has a statistically disproportionate adverse impact on a particular minority group. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1977). The seminal case on disparate impact is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), where the Court held that Title VII proscribes "practices ... neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent ... if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices," id. at 430, or if they are "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," id. at 431. 3Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (quoted in text accompanying note 71 infra); see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 311-13 (Supp. 1979) ("The 'order and allocation of proof' defined in McDonnell Douglas, refined in Furnco, has continued to be widely applied to individual cases alleging disparate treatment in hiring, discharge, discipline, promotion, transfer, layoff, retaliation, and compensation." (footnotes omitted)).
' 4 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
of disparate-treatment actions at trial," 5 little commentary has been devoted to the standard that should govern appellate review of a trial court's findings. 16 certain defendants conspired to violate the antitrust laws, while seemingly factual, also requires the application of a legal standard to the issue under consideration-namely, whether the acts committed by the defendants legally constitute a conspiracy. 2 6 A challenge to a trial court's finding upon a mixed question requires .an appellate court to decide whether the proven or admitted facts are sufficient to support the conclusion of law drawn from them. Because it assumes the trial court's findings as to the historical facts and concerns itself only with whether those facts meet some legal standard, an appellate court's review of mixed questions should be conducted under the free-reviewability standard.
The distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is fundamental to the proper allocation of judicial functions between trial and appellate courts. A trial court, having the opportunity to observe the demeanor and judge the credibility of witnesses, is usually better able to weigh the evidence than is an appellate court whose view is confined to the record on appeal. 27 Hence, under rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court's findings of fact, if not clearly erroneous, bind appellate tribunals. 28 Appellate courts, on the other hand, are more authoritative expositors of the law than trial courts and may freely set aside conclusions of law drawn by the trial court. 2 9 Rule 52(a) is premised on this division of labor between the two levels of courts, 3 0 and free review of mixed questions of law and fact is fully consistent with this apportionment. Rule 52(a) also requires trial courts, in all actions tried without a jury or with an advisory jury, to "find the facts specially and state separately [their] conclusions of law thereon. ' had held that a district court's finding that a Title VII defendant had engaged in unlawful discrimination, like findings of fact in general, must be honored by a court of appeals unless clearly erroneous. By contrast, the Fifth Circuit, 4 " followed by the Sixth, 44 Seventh, 45 Eighth," 4 and District of Columbia 47 Circuits, had distinguished "subsidiary" facts, found by direct examination of the evidence, from "ultimate" facts, dispositive of the action in which they were found, and held the latter freely reviewable. ' '49 and accordingly, an ultimate fact. These circuits, while holding themselves bound by the trial court's findings of subsidiary fact that were not clearly erroneous, conducted independent analyses of whether the subsidiary facts so upheld warranted the finding of discrimination.
These differing standards of review led to anomalous results. In the First Circuit, a judgment based on a trial court's conclusory finding that a Title VII plaintiff "proved to [the court's] satisfaction that the basic reason for the failure to promote her was because of her sex" 50 was affirmed on appeal after the finding was was a class action brought under Title VII by black employees challenging the legality of the seniority system at a steel plant operated by the petitioner. 5 The district court found that the differences in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment between minority and other employees resulting from the seniority system did not stem from racially-discriminatory intent. 6 The Fifth Circuit reversed, relying not on rule 52(a), but on its prior holding in Causey that ultimate facts in Title VII cases are freely reviewable. 57 The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held the issue of discriminatory intent to be a "pure question of fact" reversible on appeal only if clearly erroneous. 58 The Court's holding in Pullman-Standard is limited. Since the action challenged a seniority system, it was governed by a special provision of Title VII, section 703(h). That section provides that the application of different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, is not an cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1979 unlawful employment practice unless such differences are "the result of an intention to discriminate." 5 9 The Court framed its holding specifically in terms of "discriminatory intent under § 703(h)." 60 The Court then noted carefully that discriminatory intent under section 703(h) is not a mixed question of law and fact, 61 which it defined as a "question in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." ' 2 "Discriminatory intent here," it emphasized, "means actual motive; it is not a legal presumption drawn from a factual showing of something less than actual motive." 6 3 Since, under section 703(h), the defendant's discriminatory intent was a pure question of fact, the Court did not reach the applicability of rule 52(a) to mixed questions. 6 Yet, the Court did observe that findings on mixed questions "in some cases may allow an appellate court to review the facts to see if they satisfy some legal concept of discriminatory intent.
6 5 It also recognized that the Fifth Circuit's standard of free reviewability for findings of "ultimate facts" in Title VII cases might not be incorrect where "ultimate facts" are mixed questions of law and fact. 66 There is some indication in the opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (see n.15, supra) that the circuit rule with respect to 'ultimate facts' is only another way of stating a standard of review with respect to mixed questions of law and fact-the ultimate 'fact' is the statutory, legally determinative consideration (here, intentional discrimination) which is or is not satisfied by subsidiary facts admitted to be found by the trier of fact. Id. at 286 n.16.
The Court did not cite any authority in support of its remark identifying issues of ultimate fact with mixed questions, but explicit case support does exist. In Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981), an appeal from denial of federal habeas corpus relief, the Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner's contention that he had not received effective assistance of counsel was a mixed question of law and fact, id. at 1352, and noted that "[t]he term 'mixed question of fact and law' seems to be used interchangeably in our prior decisions with the term 'ultimate fact' (as distinguished from 'subsidiary' or 'intermediate' facts First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the [plaintiff's] rejection.' Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for finding of basic historical fact, the court of appeals is free to substitute its own judgment for that of the district court," id. at 1353. In a footnote, the court cited six Fifth Circuit Title VII cases, including Causey, in support of its position. Id. at 1333 n. In most Title VII actions alleging discriminatory treatment, a court's finding as to the existence of discriminatory treatment will rest on the application of these presumptions. The determination of the proper standard of review for such findings depends on whether they are findings of fact or mixed findings. It is to that question that this comment now turns.
A. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
The question whether a Title VII plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination qualifies as a mixed question under the Pullman-Standard test. In McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 2 If this formulation were the sole means of establishing a prima facie case, a mixed question would never arise. Once these four facts were proven, the legal conclusion that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case would follow ineluctably. However, the Court noted that the facts "necessarily will vary in Title VII cases" and that the McDonnell Douglas formula "is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. 78 See supra text at note 62. Of course, within the limited scope of the fourfold showing set out in McDonnell Douglas, see supra text at note 72, a demonstration by the plaintiff of each required fact does not give rise to a mixed question. Once those four facts are proven by the plaintiff, a presumption of discrimination arises as a matter of law. As the law of disparate treatment actions grows, it may be expected that the legal standards governing an increasing number of fact patterns will become settled, thus diminishing the number of occasions where the mixed question of the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination will be debatable. Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that a similar development of legal standards had occurred to restrict the freedom of the jury in finding negligence. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 122-29 (1881). As Holmes pointed out, this reduction of mixed questions to pure questions of fact and law is the ultimate aim of any area governed by mixed questions, and the interest in fostering this development is a strong argument in favor of treating such debatable questions as mixed rather than as pure questions. See infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
Lunchmen's Union Local 30,79 the Ninth Circuit adopted the free reviewability standard for a finding of the existence of a prima facie case, stating that application of the "clearly erroneous" standard is "inconsistent with the theoretical and functional role of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting procedure." 8 0 The court distinguished two components of the presumptive prima facie case: "[t]he factual inquiry . . . what facts has the plaintiff proved?" and the "legal inquiry: are these facts sufficient to support an inference of intentional discrimination?"'I It concluded that the two components are "severable" for the purposes of appellate review, 82 independently reviewed the district court's holding that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case, and affirmed the district court's judgment. 8 Since the court's "legal inquiry" entails a determination of whether proven facts are legally sufficient to constitute a prima facie case, it falls within the Pullman-Standard definition of a mixed question. 4 
B. The Defendant's Rebuttal
The foregoing reasoning is equally applicable to findings that a defendant adequately rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case. Once a prima facie case has been established, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Burdine, a defendant must introduce admissible evidence showing that the action was taken for a nondiscriminatory reason or judgment will be entered for the plaintiff. 8 5 "The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant," 8 6 but the defendant need not prove that he or she was actually motivated by the reasons offered in rebuttal.
8 7 The rebuttal need only "meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and . . . frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity" 8 8 so that the plain- SI Id. at 543 n.10. 8' Id. :3 Id. at 546-48. 4 See supra text accompanying note 62. 35 450 U.S. at 254 ("If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case." (footnote omitted)).
:6 Id. at 255. 
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tiff may thereafter prove it a pretext; the sufficiency of the defendant's evidence will be "evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions." 89 Therefore, in order for a reviewing court to determine whether the defendant's showing is legally sufficient the court must apply a standard set by law. A finding that the defendant adequately rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case thus also falls within Pullman-Standard's definition of a "mixed question of law and fact." 9 0
Similarly, a plaintiff who does make use of the McDonnell Douglas presumption but who, after rebuttal, tries to show that the defendant acted with discriminatory animus, engages in a direct proof of the defendant's "actual motive," a pure question of fact. Under Pullman-Standard, a reviewing court must credit the resulting finding if not clearly erroneous. 9 7 2. Indirect Proof. A plaintiff who seeks to prove discriminatory purpose need not demonstrate affirmatively that the defendant harbored discriminatory intent. Instead, the plaintiff may prove that intent indirectly by showing that the explanation offered by the defendant in rebuttal of the plaintiff's prima facie case is a mere pretext, "unworthy of credence." ' Such a showing, while it does not directly prove discriminatory intent, does revive the presumption of intent engendered by plaintiff's prima facie case. For example, if a member of a protected group is fired, his employer can effectively rebut the employee's prima facie case by introducing evidence of the employee's habitual tardiness; the employee might then establish that this explanation was but a pretext by showing that the employer commonly tolerated tardiness among persons not in the protected group. 9 At first blush, such an indirect proof of discriminatory intent by a showing of pretext seems to involve a question of fact, namely, whether the justification given by the defendant is genuine. This characterization finds support in the Burdine Court's references to the question of the justification's credibility as a "factual issue" 100 or "factual inquiry." 1 0 1 Furthermore, the Court's 1979), held that the McDonnell Douglas system of proof may be employed to resolve questions of an employer's discriminatory motive that arise under the ADEA. 689 F.2d at 485. On appeal from an adverse judgment, the defendant claimed that the district court had erroneously imposed on it a burden of proof to establish an affirmative defense rather than the lighter burden of production required by Burdine to dispel the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at 484. The court of appeals rejected this argument and held that the defendant had misunderstood the nature of plaintiff's proof. Discriminatory motive could, the court stated, be directly proved "without resort to any special judicially created presumptions or inferences," and if so proved, the defendant's countervailing evidence "is simply evidence offered, as in any context, to rebut proof of an essential element of any claim." Id. at 485. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in relevant part after finding the trial court's holding not clearly erroneous. Id. Upon closer examination, however, indirect proof of discriminatory intent by a showing that the employer's justification lacks credibility proves to be a mixed question of law and fact. Neither the sufficiency of defendant's rebuttal nor the plaintiff's showing that the reasons set forth in the rebuttal are unworthy of credence compels the court to determine the defendant's actual reasons for rejecting the plaintiff.1 0 4 An indirect proof of pretext requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reasons offered in the defendant's rebuttal are, in light of facts adduced by the plaintiff, legally insufficient to rebut the presumption of discriminatory intent created by the plaintiff's prima facie showing. The plaintiff must show not that the defendant's reasons are not to be credited, i.e., that they were not in fact his reasons for rejecting the plaintiff, but that they are not credible, i.e., that they are not sufficient to rebut the prima facie presumption that an employer who discriminates probably intends to do so. As such, the plaintiff's showing of pretext involves the application of the same legal standard of credibility to the defendant's proffered reasons as does assessing its legal sufficiency as a rebuttal, 0 5 though now in light of the plaintiff's evidence concerning the defendant's employment practices. Therefore, a determination of discriminatory treatment based on a plaintiff's indirect proof of pretext involves a mixed question under Pullman-Standard. 0 6
III. INTERESTS IMPLICATED BY THE CHOICE OF STANDARDS OF REvIEw IN TITLE VII ACTIONS
The critical difference between the "clearly erroneous" and "free reviewability" standards is the process that they compel an appellate court to follow. While the "clearly erroneous" standard obviously more strongly favors affirmances, neither standard prevents a disingenuous reviewing court from substituting its judg-102 Id. at 256. 103 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 10 See Burdine at 254 (rebuttal); id. at 256 (plaintiff's showing of pretext only requires demonstrating that defendant's "proffered reason was not the true one"). 105 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 206 See supra text at note 62. ment for that of the trial court.' 0 7 This section argues that free appellate review of mixed questions of law and fact in disparatetreatment actions is consistent with the purpose of rule 52(a) and with cases in analogous areas of the law. Moreover, it contends that free review of such questions will better serve the goal of fair, rapid, and uniform disposition of claims than will review under the clearly erroneous standard.
Title VII litigation imposes a considerable burden on the federal judiciary.
1 0 8 Free review of mixed questions of law and fact will ease this burden and provide lower courts with greater guidance. In order for a court employing a free reviewability standard to dispose of challenges to findings of mixed questions of law and fact, it must decide whether the historical facts found by the trial court have the legal significance that the district court attributed to them. If the same set of facts occurs in a subsequent case, the appellate court's former decision will have settled whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard, however, does not necessarily establish that a given set of facts satisfies the relevant legal standards; affirming a finding as not clearly erroneous does not require trial courts in future cases to make the same finding on the same set of facts.
In Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local 30, for example, the district court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case since they did not prove that they had applied for employment "at the time a job opening existed."' 01 9 Had the court of appeals merely affirmed this holding as not clearly erroneous, the affirmance would have had little precedential value in subsequent disparate-treatment actions. By affirming after free review, the court compelled all district courts of the Ninth Circuit to hold in the future that no prima facie case of discriminatory refusal to hire may be made in the absence of proof of a specific job opening. Gay thus establishes that the job-opening requirement of McDonnell Douglas cannot be dispensed with and that proof of the general availability of jobs is not an adequate substitute. 110 Free review of mixed questions, by yielding decisions which are necessarily precedential, will facilitate the uniform disposition of Title VII cases.
The freely reviewable standard also prevents unprincipled determinations by appellate courts. In Coble v. Hot Springs School District No. 6,111 for example, two female teachers brought individual and class claims alleging sex discrimination in the defendant school district's promotion practices. The district court held that plaintiffs had failed to prove defendant's rebuttal of their individual claims a pretext. 1 2 The court of appeals reversed under the clearly erroneous standard and remanded for award of appropriate relief. 11 3 Discussing the evidence that led it to this conclusion, the court characterized the facts in the plaintiff's favor as certainties but those in the defendant's favor as doubtful.
1 1 4 Ultimately, the court of appeals appears simply to have substituted its evaluation of the facts of an admittedly close case for that of the district court.
11 5 If the court, following the present analysis, had reviewed the lower court's determination freely, it could not have reversed without setting forth either some deficiency in the defendant's evidence or some particular facts proved by the plaintiff that accounted for its decision. Such a decision would compel a similar result in subsequent actions. By relying on the "clearly erroneous" standard, however, the court of appeals confined the precedential value of its opinion to its particular facts. Consequently, the district courts of the Eighth Circuit, after Coble, are left with an impression that their court of appeals favors Title VII plaintiffs but 115 See id. at 728 ("we have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the district court's finding . . . is clearly erroneous. There was persuasive evidence of preselection.").
no guidance as to which future plaintiffs will be similarly favored.
CONCLUSION
In Title VII disparate-treatment actions where, at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the plaintiff's evidence would not withstand a motion to dismiss in the absence of legal presumptions set forth in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, Pullman-Standard v. Swint does not compel courts of appeal to review the trial court's findings on prima facie case, rebuttal, or pretextuality under the clearly erroneous standard of rule 52(a). Free review of such questions will foster uniformity of application of the general congressional prohibition of discrimination in employment and create an incentive for trial and appellate courts to confine themselves to the functions for which they are best suited.
